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In the Beginning:
Marbury v. Madison
On the Bicentennial of the Landmark Case
',": By Jam"s.A. Noe
arly American history is filled with familiar names and deeds. Yet,
0one important hero and his cornerstone contributions to the birth of
our nation are mired in forgotten history. He is John Marshall, third Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, described by one biographer as the "definer of
a nation." He was the author of what Chief Justice William Rehnquist calls
"the most famous case ever decided by the United States Supreme Court":
Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 2 L. Ed 60 (1803)). Famous or obscure, that
seminal case is the foundation of fundamental principles of our judicial sys-
tem: judicial review, independence of the judiciary, and the rule of law. It
also underscores the existence of the separation of powers and the validity
of the third branch of government.
The Gathering Storm
To understand the significance of the Marbury decision, one must be aware of
the volatile nature of the political scene in the new nation during the last
decade of the 18th century and especially during the time of transition of the
office of president from John Adamns to Thomas Jefferson in 1801. Political
parties were emerging, and a struggle for power ensued. Intrigue, scheming,
and character assassination were common modes of political activity. Once
united, the Founding Fathers were now divided over different visions for the
future of the United States.
(Please see In the Beginning, page 30.)
The Marbury Mystery
Why Did William Marbury
Sue in the Supreme Court?
v. Madison was i dramatic, controversialand very sig-
e~p nificant case. In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court established
that the federal judiciary can review the legality of the actions of the execu-
tive and the legislative branches. It is certainly one of the most influential
decisions in the history of the United States. Because of Marbury v. Madison,
the Supreme Court was able to order President Truman to give back the steel
mills during the Korean War and later to order President Nixon to turn over
the Watergate tapes to the special proiecutor in 1974. And, of course, it is
why the Court can strike down acts o 7 Congress, something it has been doing
quite often recently.
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote this landmark opinion in what appeared
to be a minor matter: the issue of ddivering commissions to minor officials
who, this article will show, didn't r articularly care about the commissions and
who sued in a court that had no jurisdiction to order their delivery. This arti-
cle will reveal that there was anothei :,ourt with jurisdiction to order the deliv-
ery, that the petitioners knew of that c6 urt, and that that court would probably
have granted the writ. So the interesting question is why did the petitioners
bypass that court and sue instead in the Supreme Court where there was no
jurisdiction. The answer is that it was only by pursuing exactly this course
that the petitioners, ardent Federalists P1, could give Chief justice John
Marshall the opportunity to use Marbo 'y v Madison to enhance the power of
the federal judiciary at a time when it was still very weak and was the only
branch of the federal government still I the hands of the Federalists.
By suing in the Supreme Court the . etitioners gave the Court the opportuni-
ty to announce that the petitioners wej e entitled to the commissions, that the
judiciary had the authority to order th Secretary of State to deliver the com-
missions, and that the Supreme Court iad the power to hold an Act of
Congress unconstitutional. The case al Lowed the Court to assert all this while
ingeniously insulating its decision froi defiance by concluding that it did not
have jurisdiction and therefore would )rder no one to do anything-clearly a
masterpiece of indirection.
[Please see Marbury Mystery, page 34.)
Who Was
William Marbury?
) f all the disappointed office seekers in American history, only William
Marbury has been so honored as to have his portrait hung in the cham-
bers of the United States Supreme Court alongside that of James Madison. The
two titular protagonists to the Marbury v. Madison dispute had no idea that
their original contretemps would ever find its way to litigation, let alone even-
tual mythic significance as the foundation stone of judicial review.
The Commission
On Friday, February 27, 1801, John Adams signed the bill for the governance
of the District of Columbia, which authorized, among other offices, five-year
appointments of justices of the peace for the District's two counties,
Alexandria County and Washington County. Adams had but five days left in
his administration to make the appointments.
The newly created office of Justice of the Peace of Washington and Alexandria
Counties in the District of Columbia was coveted by many men. Some of the
nominees possessed no viable career alternatives. For others, the appointment
was granted as a commendation for past services to the country. Some others
were appointed because of their previous experience as justices of the peace. A
few were rewarded for their friendship to the president. And for still others, like
Marbury, it was a civic office appropriate to the stage of their developing careers.
Party allegiance mattered for some of the appointments, but contrary to incom-
ing President Jefferson's assertion, party loyalty did not figure in the choice of all
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the justices. Indeed, some were prominent
Republicans. A few, however, had become
notorious partisans of the Federalist cause.
Secretary of State John Marshall had
primary responsibility for gathering the
names. Marshall turned to Secretary of
the Navy Benjamin Stoddert, also a close
friend of his and fellow Cabinet member
and Adams supporter, for nominees for
Washington County. Marbury's name was
included in this group.
As students of history know, President
Jefferson withheld Marbury's commis-
sion. Madison did not even arrive in
Washington until long after the event
took place. Marbury, meanwhile, had
been busy for much of his life building
an extraordinarily successful and lucra-
tive career in finance in Maryland. In
Maryland tradition, an appointment as
justice of the peace was an essential
emblem of a man's membership in the
political and financial elite. Its denial by
Jefferson was a direct blow to 20 years of
work and ambition.
Humble Origins
William Marbury had not reached the
peak of his career in 1801 when he
obtained his appointment as a justice of
the peace from President Adams, but he
was a long way toward it. He was 38
years old at the time, having been born
on November 7, 1762, most likely on a
rude tobacco plantation near the town of
Piscataway in Prince George's County,
Maryland, though he spent much of his
younger years in Fairfax County,
Virginia; in Charles County, Maryland;
and in the Maryland state capital of
Annapolis. He passed most of his child-
hood following his father (also named
William) in his fruitless quest for finan-
cial security in tobacco farming.
In 1781, at age 19, William Marbury
began his career as a lowly clerk in
Annapolis to the state's auditor general,
and for the remainder of the decade as a
deputy tax collector. During this period,
the young Marbury saw a rising cabal led
by Samuel Chase, later Supreme Court
Justice, who sought to gain lucrative land
deals at the expense of the state. They
were opposed by revolutionary general
and hero Uriah Forrest, who became a
mentor and champion of Marbury's.
William Marbury had tried his hand
farming, the merchant trade, and (late in
his career) land speculation, but finally
found success in the world of finance.
Ultimately, his mastery of finance in
Annapolis propelled him into promi-
nence in the nation's new capital on the
Potomac, while his alliance with the
Georgetown and Annapolis merchants
against the rising power of Baltimore cast
his lot with men who happened to be
John Adams's greatest support.
Federalist Ally
The first half of the decade of the 1790s
was a period of growing political foment
in Maryland. In 1788 and 1789, the out-
numbered Anti-Federalists constituted a
coalition mostly along the Chesapeake.
The core of the Chesapeake coalition lay
in the original cabal led by Samuel Chase
in Baltimore. Meanwhile, the Federalist
leaders of the Potomac-later the sup-
porters of John Adams against Hamilton
and his Baltimore friends-found an
effective ally in William Marbury and
ultimately brought him into their circle.
By the end of 1792, Marbury's finan-
cial skills were recognized in the highest
places, and he had become especially
adept at handling state and federal secu-
rities enriching the state treasury. In
1796, Marbury became Agent of the State
of Maryland and rapidly rose to be the
most powerful unelected official in the
state. As Agent, Marbury engaged in
complex financial dealings, collecting
back taxes, selling estates, exchanging
debt certificates for federal stock, and
brokering on his own. His expertise and
reputation grew apace.
Maryland had never seen any agent
pursue his duties with such vigor. As far
away as Philadelphia, Marbury gained the
reputation as the state's most authoritative
financial representative. Marbury pursued
his duties with unrelenting thoroughness.
During 1796, out of a total amount of
£40,785.10.11 in cash and bonds turned
into the Maryland's treasury, Marbury
personally accounted for £35,310.0.3.
Marbury turned his considerable influ-
e;;f 40_01_
ence toward championing the financial
interests of the Annapolis and Potomac
Federalists against the growing influence
of Baltimore. There was a short and
direct route into the inner circle of the
Georgetown Federalists. He was elevated
to the board of directors of the Bank of
Columbia in early 1798, and the follow-
ing year was appointed agent to the
Washington Navy Yard, whereupon he
moved his family and his future from
Annapolis to Georgetown.
The man who appointed him as naval
agent, brought him to Georgetown, and
almost certainly championed his name as
a justice of the peace was Benjamin
Stoddert, secretary of the navy and close
intimate to President John Adams.
Stoddert had primary responsibility for
the successful defense of American ship-
ping interests in the naval war with
France. Central to Stoddert's strategy had
been the establishment of a naval yard in
Washington at Anacostia, and in 1799 he
called upon William Marbury to become
naval agent for the yet unbuilt facility.
Shipyard Scandals
If Marbury had earlier found Annapolis
filled with intrigue and rough dealing,
Washington was many times more hard-
hearted. Immediately after his appoint-
ment as naval agent, Marbury advertised
for the necessary timber and soon found a
ready supplier in John Templeman, weal-
thy Georgetown merchant and fellow
member with Marbury and Stoddert of
the Bank of Columbia's board of directors.
Marbury, however, was not happy with
Templeman's performance and searched
for another supplier. In late summer
1800, he found a prospect in John
Hughes of Alexandria and refused to
entertain Templeman's bid.
In early December, the dock was ready,
but on Friday, December 12, 1800, word
arrived from South Carolina that
Jefferson had unexpectedly taken that
state's electoral votes and the presiden-
tial election. Stoddert hurriedly wrote to
Marbury the next day insisting on "good
personal or real security not only for the
money advanced, but for the perfor-
mance of the contract."
That same Saturday, before Stoddert's
letter arrived from the Navy Department
with the new directions for Marbury,
Hughes showed up from Alexandria at
Marbury's Georgetown office ready to
sign a contract. Marbury later informed
him of his new instructions from
Stoddert containing a strict requirement
of security for the contract. Hughes
protested the new demand, and
Marbury left the office to consult with
Stoddert. Despite Marbury's protests
that he had given his word to Hughes,
Stoddert insisted on the surety. Later,
when Marbury informed Stoddert that
Hughes had agreed to the stated price,
Stoddert nonetheless ordered him to
accept a new bid from Templeman.
When Hughes returned to Marbury's
office with surety in hand, he discovered
that the contract had been let to
Templeman. He blamed Marbury for mis-
leading him. The scandal became public
in late February and was fully reported
in the press on March 2, the day that
Marbury's name was sent to the Senate
for approval as justice of the peace, and
two days before Jefferson's inauguration.
In the end, Jefferson cancelled con-
struction of all of the 74-gun ships of the
line, and the timber, so expensively and
laboriously acquired, rotted in the yards.
Undoubtedly in Jefferson's mind,
Marbury had forever become associated
with the ambitious Stoddert and the
costly overruns that had been incurred.
A few months later, Jefferson's Secretary
of War, Henry Dearborn, unceremonious-
ly fired Marbury as naval agent.
The Templeman affair had been scandal
enough, and it followed on the heels of a
bitter public dispute between Marbury
and Lewis Deblois, fellow Federalist and
foreman of the navy yard. Marbury dis-
covered that Deblois was skimming
money for himself from labor contracts,
and had obtained kickbacks from contrac-
tors. Marbury fired Deblois in the summer
of 1800 and let those in Georgetown know
why. Unemployable, Deblois took his case
to the Republican press. Marbury's power-
ful responses bested Deblois in the war of
letters in the press, but both protagonists














For all his problems as naval agent,
Marbury had nonetheless easily moved
into the highest circles of the Federalist
elite in Georgetown, where he became rich
and influential. He became Uriah Forrest's
broker, and he and his family made their
abode in Forrest's home, the very place
where President Washington and the land-
ed proprietors had made the terms that
secured Washington as the nation's capital.
The Marbury family was soon active in
Georgetown society. Marbury was elected
a manager of the dancing assemblies for
the social elite. Marbury was also a mem-
ber of the board of directors of the Bank
of Columbia, had lucrative investments,
and was beginning to make prudent pur-
chases of land. In addition, to be a mem-
ber of Uriah Forrest's Federalist clique not
only brought one into the inner circle of
Adams's favorites, but it also made one an
object of the Republican Party's enmity.
In a few months, the entire govern-
ment moved to cramped and unfinished
quarters in the still wilderness capital of
Washington. With the government now
in Washington, Uriah Forrest called upon
Marbury to do his bit to secure Adams's
re-election. The issue was how
Maryland's electoral vote for president
would be decided for the 1800 election.
Maryland, thought to be majority
Federalist, had always permitted its vot-
ers to select its electors by individual
district. But the Federalist candidates for
the Maryland state legislature were run-
ning on the platform of "a legislative
choice." If they succeeded, the state leg-
islature would vote Maryland's electoral
votes, and all ten would be Adams's.
Four representatives would be elected
from Montgomery County, and Forrest
sought to make sure that they were all
pledged to change Maryland's method of
selecting presidential electors. The
Federalists were surprised when Daniel
Reintzell, prominent politician and jus-
tice of the peace, announced that he
would stand for the post and was against
"a legislative choice."
A small delegation of the most promi-
nent Federalists, including Forrest and
Marbury, met with Reintzell to ask him
to withdraw. Reintzell then publicly
broke with the Federalists, and took his
case to the press, naming those who had
importuned him, including William
Marbury. In the election, the Republicans
took over the legislature. There would be
no "legislative choice." Along with oth-
ers, William Marbury had publicly inter-
vened on behalf of John Adams in a
move that might have cost Thomas
Jefferson the election.
In the end, Maryland's voters, choosing
their electors by district, divided the
state's ten electoral votes evenly between
Adams and Jefferson. When the electoral
votes were finally tallied nationwide,
Jefferson had bested Adams 73 to 65. Had
the Federalists been able to hold on to the
Maryland legislature, all of Maryland's
votes would have flowed to Adams. John
Adams would have been re-elected to a
second presidential term, and the name of
William Marbury would never have
appeared in the history books.
Cancelled Appointment
In the rush of appointments before he
left office, President Adams included
Marbury among the 23 names he sent to
the Senate as justices of the peace for
Washington County. Of that number, ten
were prominent Federalist partisans
including Marbury. Four other appoint-
ees were from old and respected Fed-
eralist families in the area. Adams also
appointed five men, including Daniel
Reintzell, three or four of whom were
Republican, because they were sitting
justices of the peace under Maryland
law. William Thornton, celebrated archi-
tect of the Capitol, was also appointed,
though he too was a Republican. Finally,
Adams's friend Tristam Dalton and his
son-in-law, Lewis Deblois, were appoint-
ed as personal favors to Adams. Marbury
therefore had among his companions the
man he fired for corruption and the man
he sought to defeat for the assembly.
Jefferson had declared that all executive
appointments made by Adams since
December 1800, when it was clear that
Jefferson had won the election, were "nul-
lities." By the time he took the oath of
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touch the Adams's judicial appointments
that had life tenure, but all the others
were vulnerable. He replaced all the fed-
eral attorneys and marshals, and he seized
his chance to void the five-year appoint-
ments of the justices of the peace when he
found that they had been undelivered.
By doing so, however, Jefferson had
left the District of Columbia without a
government, for the justices of the peace
were to constitute the county legisla-
tures. In addition, civil society at that
time simply could not operate without
justices of the peace being readily avail-
able. Consequently, Jefferson had to for-
mulate quickly his own list of nominees
and give them recess appointments.
John Adams had been transparent
about his appointments. He rewarded the
Federalists who had supported him,
helped a couple of friends, and recognized
long-standing pillars of the community.
But he did not hesitate from continuing in
office justices of the peace who were
already sitting and serving their neighbor-
hoods, even if they were Republicans, or
had acted overtly against his re-election.
Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, was
both more surreptitious and more partisan
in making his selections.
The Trail to the Trial
Coming into office expressing the hope
that Federalists and Republicans could
work together, Jefferson could not seem to
act in a partisan manner during his first
week in office. His first cover was to claim
that Adams had appointed too many jus-
tices of the peace. His second was that
Adams had rewarded Federalists with an
unnecessary and expensive number of
offices. The excuses were flimsy. First,
throughout the rest of Jefferson's adminis-
tration, citizens desperately wrote the
president and the secretary of state of their
need for more justices in the outlying areas
of the district, but Jefferson, caught with
his own excuse that Adams had appointed
an excess number, could not appoint any
more until his second term. Second, many
of Adams's appointments were, in fact,
Republican. In addition, those offices were
funded by the fees assessed for their ser-
vices, and not the federal treasury, so
Jefferson could not credibly claim that his
action was a cost-cutting move.
Nonetheless, he had to follow through
on his purported reasons for withholding
the commissions. He reduced the num-
ber of justices of the peace, carefully
culling those he regarded as enemies and
substituting those who supported him.
Despite the man's experience and posi-
tion, Marbury must have been one of the
easiest cuts for Jefferson to make.
Marbury's life's work in securities trad-
ing was associated with the Hamiltonian
"stock jobbers" whom Jefferson detested,
for Marbury had rejected farming for the
world of negotiable instruments. He had
been the subject of much newspaper
notoriety in the Republican press in the
few months preceding inauguration. He
had personally weighed in to try to
swing all of Maryland's votes to Adams,
which if successful, would have kept
Jefferson from his desired Revolution of
1800. Marbury was also tied to the enor-
mous cost overruns associated with a
navy that Jefferson wanted cut to the
bare minimum. He had no connection to
a family or to figures to whom Jefferson
owed any social or political favor, and
was, in fact, intimately tied to the
Forrest-Stoddert clique whom the
Republicans in Georgetown and
Washington most despised.
Kept from the status and position of
being justice of the peace, William
Marbury soon turned to Charles Lee, for-
mer attorney general, to seek his exoner-
ation before the Federalist Supreme
Court and John Marshall. The rest, as
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